The project to develop the Colorado Benefits Management System (CBMS) was begun with high hopes and the best of intentions. Its vision was to replace six aging legacy systems supporting various State administered welfare programs with a single system using current technologies. The expected benefits from CBMS were better service to clients and assurance that the State's welfare programs were being administered properly. The bulk of the development effort was outsourced to a large systems integration firm, and a comprehensive project oversight structure was put in place. Despite these actions, the project was troubled from the start. Nearing one more projected conversion date, the two executive sponsors of the project were faced with a decision of whether or not to implement the system despite protests from the user community that CBMS was not ready to be put into operation.
These programs were directed at the State level and administered by the Counties. When CBMS was up and operating, all of Colorado's welfare programs would use a single up-to-date computer system. With CBMS, clients eligible to receive benefits from more than one program would no longer need to find their way to several different offices and file multiple applications. The sick, the hungry, elderly, and children would receive immediate help while the State and the Counties would save money.
In their letter, the county representatives listed several problems and concerns they had with the status of CBMS. They were concerned with:
• the error rate in the user acceptance test (UAT)
• inadequate testing of interfaces to other service programs
• the security of the system • customer service/staff workload issues • numerous conversion issues
• unresolved system defects • compliance with Federal law
The letter concluded by stating:
As a result of the above issues, the four pilot Counties adamantly believe that the implementation of CBMS on September 1, 2004, is unacceptable. A premature implementation will result in serious impacts to clients and County Departments of Human Services. We feel the system must first be adequately tested and the pilots successful before moving forward on this major computer conversion.
Marva and Karen looked at each other with concern in their eyes. When they agreed to be cochairs of the CBMS project's Executive Oversight Committee (EOC), they had no idea the project was going to be such a frustrating and aggravating experience. After all, they were senior managers in State Government, not IT professionals. CBMS took up too much of their time already and they wanted to get it behind them. Still, they knew they needed to respond to the Counties' letter and were worried about the issues it documented. On the other hand, the project repeatedly requested funds in excess of the original appropriation over the last four years from the Joint Budget Committee (JBC) of the Colorado Legislature. Marva and Karen were reluctant to ask for more. Further, a number of stakeholders needed to be considered:
• The internal and external IT professionals involved in CBMS
• The Colorado State Departments
• The end users in the Counties
• The Federal Government • The citizens affected by the welfare programs The Colorado economy was declining after a decade of prosperity, and the State was facing deficits. Some of the CBMS stakeholders were raising red flags, while others gave no indication there was any reason not to proceed with the September 1 conversion as planned. The November 2004 elections were looming.
Marva and Karen discussed their options, and identified three possible avenues:
1. They could postpone the conversion until all the stakeholders were satisfied.
2. They could abort the project.
3. They could convert on September 1 as scheduled, in spite of the red flags.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1989, it became apparent that the six legacy systems supporting the welfare systems in Colorado were reaching the stage where they needed to be replaced. They were using obsolete technology and were becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. The late eighties and early nineties was the time when many mainframe-based legacy systems were being replaced by client-server architectures, taking advantage of the graphical user interfaces available on personal computers on the desks of knowledge workers in large organizations, and the advances in networking technologies.
Like many legacy systems of the time, the six Colorado systems were developed at different points in time, and typically supported a single program, e.g. Food Stamps. The vision of CBMS was to combine the databases required for the six systems into a single database which combined all information concerning a welfare client, and to incorporate the rules for managing each program into computer code. Thus, clients would be better served because a single knowledge worker could handle the processing of benefits for multiple programs, clients would not need to supply the same information to several knowledge workers at different locations, the client information used for all programs would be consistent, and rules for qualification and receipt of benefits would be applied correctly. Since many of the welfare programs were at least partially funded by the US Federal Government, the latter point was important for Colorado State Departments' compliance reporting to Federal Agencies.
As an added benefit to clients, knowledge workers would be able to receive assurance from CBMS that clients were receiving all of the benefits they were entitled to receive. As an added incentive to the State and Counties, once the system was installed, it would result in a reduction in headcount. A summary of the scope and anticipated benefits of the project are shown in Appendix II.
Despite the benefits envisioned for CBMS, it took nine years to obtain funding for the design, construction, and installation of the new system from the Colorado Legislature. Like any new project (in either the public or the private sector), CBMS was required to compete with other projects that required incremental funding. CBMS never seemed to rise to the top of the Legislature's priority list. Finally, in 1999, funds were allocated to begin some initial work. Dynamics Research Corporation (DRC) (www.drc.com) was hired to develop a set of requirements for CBMS in sufficient detail to include in a Request for Proposal (RFP). Since IT at that time was thriving as a result of the need to solve the Y2K problem 1 and the Internet boom, skilled IT professionals were in short supply. As a result, state governments found it difficult to compete with the private sector in hiring IT professionals, particularly in those sectors where knowledge of state-of-the-art technologies was required. For this reason, the decision was made to engage a professional services firm to handle the development and operation of CBMS.
The State received two responses to its RFP, one from EDS and the other from IBM. Both were more than $100 million higher than the $220 million the JBC had authorized for the development and operation of CBMS over a ten year period. Accordingly, the State employees responsible for acquisition went back to the vendors and asked them to "clarify" their bids, i.e. to find a way to lower them to not exceed the amount authorized by the legislature's Joint Budget Committee (JBC).
In the end, EDS (www.eds.com) was awarded the contract. The three factors that led to its selection included the proposal to adopt a "time of touch conversion" (as explained below), a phased rollout, and its experience on similar systems in the States of Florida and Arkansas.
• One key step in a traditional conversion from an old to a new system involves converting system data from the old system(s) to the format needed by the new system. Usually this conversion is done all at once, at the time of conversion. EDS concluded that a "time of touch" conversion, in which data are converted the first time it was accessed by a knowledge worker under the new system, would save both time and money.
• A phased roll-out would make the CBMS available to Counties in phases, rather than all at once. For example, one welfare program might be converted in one County, and then made available to other Counties on a phased basis once the bugs were worked out in the initial County.
• EDS had a troubled conversion in Florida in the early nineties [Glass 1998 ] and pointed out that they had learned from the mistakes they made there. They also had a similar project underway in Arkansas and proposed to save time by modifying programs from Arkansas to meet Colorado's requirements.
Even though Federal funds would be used to fund more than half the cost of CBMS, the Federal Government did not have a say in the selection of the outside contractor. On the other hand, they could and did specify that an independent verification and validation (IV&V) firm be hired to provide independent oversight and reporting on the project's progress. Maximus (www.maximus.com) was retained as the IV&V firm.
III. PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND OVERSIGHT
Experienced IT professionals know that large systems development projects like CBMS are among the most complex and challenging tasks that human beings undertake. Project complexity tends to increase as the project size increases. In 1999, an income tax system under development for the Colorado Department of Revenue was abandoned after an expenditure of some $15 million. This action caused a flurry of negative publicity. It resulted in establishing the Governor's Office of Innovation and Technology (OIT) by the State Legislature and signed into law by Governor Bill Owens. Among other things, OIT was established to "Transform state government, a key element of the technology infrastructure, through the effective, efficient and innovative use of technology." [Bhattacherjee 2000 ].
Aborting CBMS after the expenditure of more than $90 million would make taxpayers wonder whether the State really knew how to use technology efficiently and effectively. Recent negative publicity also arose from the troubled IT projects in the US Federal Government. For example, in December 2003, an $8 billion Internal Revenue Service project was 40% over budget after spending $1 billion [Johnston 2003 ], and the FBI's Virtual Case File system designed to help track terrorists was rumored to be ready for the scrap heap after well over $100 million had been spent [Verton 2004 ].
IT professionals are also aware of studies like the Chaos Reports published by the Standish Group [2003] on IT project successes and failures. For example, the latest publicly available report at that time, based on a 2003 survey of 13,522 U.S. IT projects completed in 2002, showed that just 34% of all IT projects were considered successful, 51% were challenged and 15% were dubbed as outright failures.
The report also calculated that "The lost dollar value for U.S. projects in 2002 was estimated at $38 billion with another $17 billion in cost overruns for a total project waste of $55 billion against $255 billion in project spending." [Standish 2003 ].
Most seasoned IT professionals learn that one of the principal reasons for failed or less than successful projects is a failure to get the business requirements of a new system right. And, in turn, the failure to get the requirements right is most often due to poor communication and insufficient involvement and commitment from the users for whom a new system is being designed.
A typical IT project would be organized along the following lines [Flatten et al 1991] :
• An Executive Sponsor, or product champion, the senior executive in the organization who authorizes and obtains funding for the project; • A Project Steering Committee, whose members usually are key user managers and a senior IT executive; • A Project Manager, the individual responsible for the planning and control of the project; and • The Project Team, individuals assigned to the project with the necessary skills required to execute the project plan.
The CBMS project organization was a bit more complicated than most ( Figure 1 ). It consisted of the following:
• Executive Oversight Committee (EOC (Maximus) . The IV&V contractor reported to the OIT. Maximus provided independent analysis and identification of project development risks. It was not part of the development contract, being funded separately. Maximus reviewed all requirements for compliance prior to progressing to the next phase of the project (verification), and reviewed all products to assure they were in accordance with approved requirements (validation).
• CBMS Project Quality Assurance Vendor (QA). An independent QA vendor joined the project on July 31, 2001. Reporting to the EOC, the vendor was responsible for implementing project quality assurance processes, monitoring project activities and work in progress, reviewing and assessing project deliverables, and reporting status findings and recommendations.
• Project Manager. Since a State employee with the requisite skills to serve as project manager for CBMS was not available, the State contracted with AMS (www.ams.com), a systems integration firm, to furnish a full-time project manager.
• Project Team. The project team was a mix of EDS and State employees. Some of the EDS personnel were collocated with the team in Colorado while others worked in remote locations. The EOC believed all stakeholders were adequately represented. However, successful execution required that accountability be clear, that responsibility be focused, that the CBMS vision be truly shared among all stakeholders, and that the efforts of all stakeholders be well coordinated. Furthermore, since CBMS hired both IV&V and QA personnel to perform an independent review of the project's progress, it was important that their periodic reports to the OIT and EOC be carefully considered.
IV. PROJECT EXECUTION
The project was behind schedule virtually from the beginning. The signed contract with EDS was reviewed by IV&V and several concerns were identified:
• No milestones were specified for the project, • Responsibility for deliverables was not pinpointed, and
• No performance criteria were specified.
A report summarizing these concerns was written and given to OIT. The report went no further, since it was submitted after the contract was already approved.
One of the biggest problems with the contract was its fixed price basis. Typically a project of this size and scope will involve many add-ons. In particular, since the CBMS set of requirements were quite ambiguous and the system was expected to operate in a dynamic environment, the rationale for a fixed price contract was questionable. For example, Congress passed a national Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996. This act created major requirements for how agencies handled health-related data. Compliance with the act required modifications in the design of CBMS. With a fixed price contract, there is little to no motivation on the part of the contractors to complete additional work. EDS wanted to stick to the original requirements and avoid scope creep 2 . Any changes required a change order. Some of the managers estimated that it took two to three weeks to obtain a detailed estimate from EDS on the cost of a change, and another month to make the change.
More and more delays occurred putting the project further behind schedule (Table 1) . Stakeholders were feeling pressured in various ways. The State employees were concerned about reports to the Federal Government to assure the programs were in compliance, while the Counties worried about the way CBMS would work in their offices, the looming workload associated with training and data conversion, the ease of use of the system and, of course, the welfare of their clients. In April, 2002, the time of touch conversion proposal was officially abandoned. Twenty-one months were expended in the effort to use time of touch, the "innovative and proven methodology to convert data into CBMS." The design of the decision tables 3 (DTs), used by the Rules Engine in the CBMS software to determine benefit eligibility, automatically began to run excessively behind schedule. Little by little the dream project was turning into a nightmare.
On January 1, 2004, the IV&V firm submitted their final report. [Maximus, 2004] . The Executive Summary noted that the detailed reports IV&V prepared weekly "were delivered to OIT for disposition, while a summary of each weekly status report was distributed to a number of participating State and Federal organizations as determined by OIT." The final report's Executive Summary went on to say that "Unfortunately, the CBMS environment was not generally conducive to accepting or responding to the IV&V findings in a timely manner, resulting in greater impact to project progress than should have occurred".
The report summarized major flaws in the following areas:
• The State's vendor acquisition strategies, • establishment of the initial CBMS requirements baseline, • technical understanding of the State's requirements versus the vendor's proposed solution, and
• establishment of an adequate State organizational structure (processes, procedures, resources, organizational structure, interfaces, etc.) to manage the CBMS. • Decision Tables, a State responsibility to develop, are difficult for the State to manage with any predictability. ♦ They continue to cause delays in the completion of initial development of the complete suite of CBMS DTs. ♦ A high volume of defects are encountered once the DTs began User Acceptance Testing (UAT). ♦ The DTs cause delays in correcting defects and completing UAT. ♦ The DTs create significant doubt as to the State's ability to manage DTs during Pilot and production.
• A number of key tasks were not planned in detail or assessed against other key project activities and milestones making it difficult to track, report, or predict project progress effectively or accurately.
• County readiness for Pilot or rollout is not clear. Although discussions of readiness occur between the CBMS Project Management Office and the Counties during meetings, structured and systematic progress reporting by the Counties continues to be extremely weak.
• UAT continues to slip, with increased planning of concurrent events that increases the risk of project failure.
The Maximus contract ended in January 2004, as originally scheduled, even though CBMS was still underway. Neither the EOC nor the OIT was able to come up with funding to extend the Maximus contract.
Significant roadblocks were also present in the pilot testing for CBMS. The Counties requested a three-month pilot, but the project pared it down to six weeks. The decision tables were still not completed even during the pilot. In March, 2004, the EOC reported that progress was not made in the pilot as had been planned due to early issues with access to the State Portal and the higher than anticipated volume of problems with the application.
The last piece of the CBMS's initial innovative vision was abandoned in April 2004. EDS informed the State that the phased conversion wouldn't work. The state of the art described in the original EDS proposal was now completely gone from CBMS. The conversion and rollout plans needed to be redone. In addition, more data needs were identified. It was estimated that only 25-35% of the data could be converted within the new system, and 65-75% of the data needed manual entry and cleansing 4 . The EOC informed the Counties that the planned Centralized Data Entry process to assist Counties with data entry was not feasible. Instead, funds would be allocated to the Counties. Four months from rollout, the Counties learned the manual burden of entering data required by CBMS would be left to them. The Counties projected the time and cost now required for the data entry and EDS claimed the projections were grossly in error. The project was extended to September 1, 2004. JBC called this the "drop dead" date.
From July 26, 2004 to August 6, 2004, three weeks before the planned September 1 rollout, a two-week pilot was held even though some functionalities were not ready for testing. The Counties expressed a concern about the pilots but EDS said they were just afraid of change. EDS said they saw the same fear from their experience in similar projects they led in Arizona, Texas, and Florida. The pilot testing proceeded.
Two sets of scenarios were used in the UAT, one developed by the State, and another developed by the Counties. In the August 13, 2004 letter from the Counties, it was stated, "The pilot planned scenarios experienced a 63% accuracy rate, and the controlled state scenarios a 94% accuracy
The counties have spent thousands of hours preparing for CBMS, and will continue to do so as we are working towards conversion and implementation. We are enthusiastic about CBMS, its functionalities, and the improved Customer Service it could potentially offer our clients. However, as we stated in the past, we do not want to prematurely convert to a system that may provide inaccurate benefits to over 596,000 Colorado clients. As pilot counties, we have serious concerns regarding the readiness of this project, including conversion issues, potential lawsuits, the high error rate experienced by the pilot planned scenarios, security, procedural papers, Federal sanctions and the number of unresolved Severity I and II problems. Until we feel more comfortable with the maturity of this application, we cannot support a "Go" decision on implementation in September, and in fact, we strongly oppose the roll out as planned. An overview of our primary issues regarding the CBMS pilot are as follows:
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• Error rate-The pilot planned scenarios experienced a 63% accuracy rate, and the controlled state scenarios a 94% accuracy rate. The commitment was that CBMS would not be implemented until the accuracy rate was 98-99%. At a 90% accuracy over 60,000 clients would be adversely affected. The current error rate of over 30% is not acceptable, and the system cannot be implemented until we reach, at a minimum, a 98% rate.
• Security-Security continues to be an issue. In Fremont County, a user who should not have had the access, was able to go in and authorize a payment without supervisor intervention. Additionally, a user was able to go into another county and reduce the amount of a claim, while yet another user was able to go into another county and delete a miscellaneous payment. These issues open the door for potential employee fraud and create regulatory compliance issues.
• Conversion Issues-Numerous conversion issues have been identified during Pilot II, mostly due to incorrect data mapping, i.e., data is converted into wrong fields. For instance, children are being converted as to applying for long term care, or adult medical cases are showing that the clients do not meet the level of care. Some persons/cases were not converted.
• Federal law-We remain concerned regarding compliance with the Federal law. In particular, the Food Stamp mass change, based on estimation of benefit change, will incorrectly update the Food Stamp benefits to tens of thousands of clients. This will not meet the Federal requirement of timely and accurate benefits, in addition to the tremendous work load on staff to correct over 80,000 cases prior to the freeze flag being lifted. The recovery effort on this alone is tremendous. The same problems will exist as it relates to the COLA for Adult Programs on December 31, 2004.
Client noticing has numerous problems, with the most notable being a breach of confidentiality by displaying SSN's, including the Absent Parent's on the Statement of Facts. Also of concern are the legal issues involved with improper noticing, where the incorrect person is cited for the action or the incorrect reason to support the action taken is cited. Other client notice issues include denying benefits for a program area, but sending the notice of a new worker for that program, or denying benefits but noticing the client that benefits were approved. This issue alone may result in an extreme number of appeals and sanctions.
In addition to these major issues with compliance of the Federal law, we cannot exclude the concern that a 30% error rate in benefit determination/grant calculation, in conjunction with the benefit freeze flag, will result in clients to be paid who should not be paid, or clients to be to be paid incorrectly.
• Interfaces-To date, only 10% of the interfaces to other service programs have been fully tested and found successful. This is of major concern, as problems with CBMS will not only impact client benefits in this system, but could be disastrous to programs such as Child Support, Child Care and Child Welfare. The interface with Social Security (SDX for SSI cases) during the Pilot II testing did not perform as expected for the 1634 cases and can actually duplicate cases.
• Customer Service/Staff workload issues-All of the above issues adversely impact the workload on staff and the level of customer service that we provide to our clients. In addition to the areas previously noted, we are extremely concerned about the large number of procedures that require staff to work around the system. These appear to be volumes, and the training alone to be able to perform these procedures is insurmountable. Additionally, staff are finding the time that it takes to complete AI and II is not reasonable, and staff are even recommending clients complete a paper application and the information be data entered into CBMS, rather than conducting live interviews.
• TPN's and Defects-To date, over 107 catastrophic and disabling problems are still unresolved. Even if the Project Team were able to fix all the errors by roll out, there is no ability for the counties to be able to verify the success of these changes. This translates into our 596,000 plus clients serving as test cases for the system.
• As a result of the above issues, the four pilot counties adamantly believe that the implementation of CBMS on September 1, 2004, is unacceptable. A premature implementation will result in serious impacts to clients and County Departments of Human Services. We feel the system must first be adequately tested and the pilots successful before moving forward on this major computer conversion. 
APPENDIX II. ARCHIVED CBMS PROJECT OVERVIEW
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CBMS
